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5 Sitting between two chairs 
Cambodia's dual citizenship debate 
Kathryn Poethig1 
By the time I arrived in Phnom Penh in 1996, the Second Prime Minister 
Hun Sen had called a French Cambodian government official a "dog" and 
declared vigorously that those holding two passports were "down-grading 
for the nation" (Ker 1996). One month later, Hun Sen's Cambodian 
People's Party (CPP) declared single citizenship for government leaders 
an official position. During the fracas, I interviewed the Undersecretary 
of Foreign Affairs, Marina Pok, a French Cambodian citizen. When asked 
about her position on the dual citizenship of government officials, she 
queried in French-accented English: "Why should one give up one's dual 
nationality? Is it against the interest of the nation? Is it to have a pure 
Cambodian nation?"2 This dual affiliation had become as excruciating as 
"sitting between two chairs." My paper focuses on the charged debate in 
Phnom Penh regarding the status of dual citizens in the Cambodian gov-
ernment during the 1990s. Through it, I show how the sense of "true" 
belonging to the post-war nation diverged between local and transnational 
government officials. Those who were against government officials carry-
ing dual citizenship included both CPP members and diaspora Cambodians, 
though their arguments differed. Ultimately, the arguments for and against 
dual citizenship sought a baseline definition of national identity and a way 
to identify those who could signify its center. 
That the debate on dual citizenship was possible at all reflected new 
global developments regarding multiple citizenships. Dual citizens have 
increased worldwide in the last 20 years.3 A significant increase in this 
trend was related to the 1990s "decade of return" as the break-up of the 
Soviet Union and its client states sent thousands of refugees who had 
resettled in North America, Australia, and Europe, back to homelands 
undergoing free market makeovers and a "transition to democracy." The 
most controversial dual citizens were those returning to high-level govern-
ment posts in the countries they had fled. Such rewards of exile transpired 
in several new nations in Eastern Europe, but Cambodia's government of 
dual citizens was unique in rank and scope.4 The majority of Cambodian 
exiles returned from the US, Canada, Australia, and France, which recog-
nized some form of dual citizenship. For the first five years of the new 
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government, more than half of the National Assembly and the top offi-
cials of key ministries were dual citizens. Prince Norodom Ranariddh, one 
of the co-prime ministers, was a French citizen, and high officials of such 
powerful ministries as the Interior, Information, Foreign Affairs, and 
Finance were citizens from France, Australia, and the US. 
Cambodia's "two-headed government" offered an unusual example of 
the impact of diaspora politics on globally monitored "transition to democ-
racies" in the 1990s. The 1991 Paris Peace Agreement stipulated that 
Cambodian exiles could return to their homeland to run in the ON-
monitored 1993 elections. Cambodian officials of the Vietnamese-backed 
State of Cambodia had re-organized as the CPP, and as the sole power 
brokers through Vietnam's decade-long occupation, they were markedly 
reluctant to relinquish the government to returning exiles. 5 When the 
royalist FUNCINPEC party won the largest number of seats in the govern-
ment, the CPP refused to step down. In order to ease the transition, the 
two parties agreed to a "two-headed" solution-two party representatives 
for a single position, hence, a First and a Second Prime Minister. 
Given the catastrophic Khmer Rouge era and the decade-long Viet-
namese occupation that followed in the 1980s, Cambodians everywhere 
were concerned with a crisis of national identity (Ebihara et al. 1994). 
Indeed, the 1993 Constitutional Convention expressed that one of its "future 
tasks" was to "determine who, precisely, are 'THE PEOPLE OF CAMBO-
DIA."' 6 Just who, precisely, the Cambodian people were precipitated a 
series of highly charged debates about citizenship in the immigration, 
nationality, and electoral laws that were drafted in the first years of the 
new democracy. For overseas Cambodians who were returning as dual cit-
izens, the public debate involved their place in the politics of homeland 
and host nation. From 1994 to 1996, I interviewed Cambodian refugees 
who had returned to Phnom Penh to explore how their multiple political 
subjectivities affected their moral discourse of Cambodian citizenship. The 
subject of our discussions was a slate of new citizenship laws that were 
the first outputs of the new government. What emerged was a peripatetic 
morality, investing arguments with a moral authority based on their vari-
ous identities as refugees, Cambodians, Americans, Christians or Buddhists, 
and dual citizens (Poethig 2003). The controversy about government offi-
cials with two passports was already circulating among prominent 
Cambodian Americans in Phnom Penh in 1995. Cognizant of their own 
ambivalent citizenship, their argument for and against dual citizenship 
drove to the heart of transnational identity. 
Transnational identity and the government debate 
Dual citizenship occurs because there is no uniform guidance under inter-
national law on the acquisition of citizenship (W eis 1979). 7 It erodes the 
basic premises of modern political citizenship as singular and sacred and 
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betrays the rhetoric of belonging so primary to the nation state. Anthro-
pologists claim that de-territorialized peoples upset the assumption that 
one's identity is fixed to a place or a national culture (Appadurai 1993; 
Clifford 1994; Hannerz 1996), indicating instead that transnational cultures 
are formed through multi-stranded social relations between homelands and 
settlement (Glick Schiller et al. 1995). The identities of those who shuttle 
across borders are thus hybrid, their allegiances multiple. Cambodians 
in diaspora uniquely embody this fractured legal, political, and cultural 
status when they return to Cambodia. Cambodians who became American 
citizens, for example, chose to retain their original citizenship when they 
learned that US rulings were amenable to dual citizenship. One could 
possess two passports as long as the dual citizen produced the US passport 
upon entry to US territories. At the time, there was, however, consider-
able confusion around citizenship laws in Cambodia as both immigration 
and nationality laws were being redrafted. Upon their return, these former 
refugees often used their US, Australian, or French passport to enter 
Cambodia and were thus treated as aliens requiring residency visas. 
The debate on the dual citizenship of government officials pitted the 
CPP as the opposition party against FUNCINPEC and other less visible 
exiled parties. For CPP officials, dual citizenship contradicted their notion 
of a nation of cultural purity based on stationary Khmerness. They argued 
that returning Cambodians' cultural hybridity meant that they were not 
true Khmer. Furthermore, dual citizens would not be able to adjudicate 
conflicts of interest between the nations in which they held membership. 
The argument here turned around the terms "Khmer Angkor" and 
"anikachun." "True Cambodians" and authentic members of the nation 
are Khmer Angkor, signified by an ancient glorious era in Cambodian 
history. Returning Cambodians are called anikachun. In some cases, they 
are also referred to as "anikachun chochuh," a derogatory term. Originally, 
anikachun or anikajan referred to citizens of a country living abroad or 
resident aliens, and commonly designated settler Chinese and Vietnamese 
in Cambodia (who are now called antaopriive or immigrant). Those I 
interviewed felt that even a neutral reference to overseas Cambodians as 
anikachun was an unwanted affiliation since settler Vietnamese have long 
been a pariah group due to the anxiety Cambodians felt towards a history 
of Vietnam's aggression.8 To be anikachun or, worse, anikachun chochuh 
thus implied that overseas Cambodians had not only lost the Khmer "soul" 
in exile but were allied by association with the historic enemy of the 
motherland. They thus returned as the inassimilable "other." Although 
they too had fled the country during the Khmer Rouge era, the CPP claimed 
identity as Khmer Angkor and counterpoised it to anikachun. Given this 
distinction, dual-citizen government officials redefined national purity, 
loyalty, and commitment. They claimed a more hybrid national community, 
argued that even single citizens could have mixed loyalties, and celebrated 
the benefits of dual consciousness in the international sphere. 
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Prime Minister Hun Sen's case against dual citizens: 
noodles or rice gruel 
By early 1996, a controversial clause in the pending Nationality Law requir-
ing single nationality for senior government officials revealed the widening 
gap between the CPP and FUNCINPEC. As the Electoral Law was still in 
draft form and both commune and national elections were looming, there 
was intense pressure to establish the role of dual citizens in the govern-
ment in the Nationality Law.9 Bou Thang, chair of the CPP Commission 
handling the draft of the Nationality Law, questioned dual citizens' ability 
to be "[loyal] to the country" (Heng and Seng 1996). In a series of public 
attacks, Second Prime Minister Hun Sen urged FUNCINPEC officials to 
"give up [their] extra nationality now or [they] will have no right to run 
in the elections" (Hun Sen 1996a; see also Barber 1996). By June, the CPP 
Central Committee Plenum issued a statement to "support the principle of 
one nationality of political leaders" (Cambodian People's Party 1996). 
Prime Minister Hun Sen and other CPP officials argued that expatriate gov-
ernment officials were a liability to the nation for two reasons. First, anyone 
holding two passports lacked a "single-hearted" nationalism and would 
endanger national security because of their conflicting allegiances. Second, 
as returning refugees, these officials were "fair-weather" citizens who were 
no longer truly Khmer and would be unable to endure the necessary hard-
ship of a poor struggling country. He juxtaposed this with his own party's 
status as Khmer Angkor, aligned with the common folk. 
In the first case, the Second Prime Minister noted that he had initially 
rejected the idea of dual citizenship for government officials when it had 
been raised at the 1991 Paris negotiations. But afterward, he had reluc-
tantly agreed to a grace period: 
It did not seem to be appropriate for some of the brothers to make 
the minimal sacrifice of relinquishing their foreign nationality because 
there was then no real stability, no assurances that our country would 
have the necessary peace to hold elections. Forcing them to relinquish 
their foreign nationality seemed to be too cruel. 
(Hun Sen 1996a) 
With a second national election in 1998 looming, the grace period for the 
forced collaboration of CPP and FUNCINPEC was over. Prime Minister 
Hun Sen and his party instigated a call for this "minimal sacrifice." If the 
loss of a second citizenship was "too cruel," its sacrifice would indicate 
intent to place Cambodia before all other interests. Claiming the better 
part of nationalism, he caricatured officials with dual citizenship as the 
nation's bigamists: 10 
When one wife is angry with him, he runs to the embrace of the other 
wife. He steals things from one place and keeps them in the other 
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place ... [P]oliticians should have only one nationality in order to be 
fully responsible to the nation and to maintain equity between two 
nationalities. 
(Hun Sen 1996b) 
But a pledge of unaligned allegiance was difficult for either party to claim. 
As CPP officials had risen to power during the Vietnamese occupation 
and FUNCINPEC officials returned from nations that had funded the 
anti-Communist resistance, all Cambodian officials were highly sensitive 
about any compromise of Cambodian sovereignty. Attacked by his oppo-
nents as a "Vietnamese puppet," Hun Sen's own allegiance had been 
questioned. Earlier in 1996, FUNCINPEC officials had opposed the cele-
bration of January 7 as an official Cambodian holiday established by the 
Vietnamese to commemorate their rout of the Khmer Rouge in 1979. Both 
parties had to relinquish foreign patronage to gain legitimate claim to the 
nation. 
In his second point, Hun Sen played on a perceived moral weakness of 
dual citizens who were formerly refugees. His argument challenged the 
political category of refugee identity itself as the modern icon of victim-
ization and statelessness. He intimated that the burden of suffering was 
borne not by those who fled, the common refugee plight, but by those who 
remained. Refugees had chosen self-preservation over duty. Statelessness 
was thus reconfigured as voluntarism and abandonment. This abandonment 
had not been punished but rewarded by multiple privileges, one of which 
was a second nationality. The only way to recover trust was to lose some-
thing again-the second passport. This argument negated not only the 
efficacy but the authenticity of "fax nationalisms" (Anderson 1992) against 
local nationalisms. When Cambodians fled their homeland they betrayed 
their patriotism so fundamentally that they should not be trusted with its 
renewed expression in better times. The efforts of exiled Cambodians scat-
tered through France, Canada, Switzerland, Australia, and the US who 
lobbied for Cambodia's reconstruction were lost on a populace for whom 
transnational citizens were fair-weather cousins. They arrived during the 
good times; they would leave during the bad times. 
Furthermore, these returning refugees who had lived in luxury while 
others suffered did not "know what Khmer Angkor are, what really poor 
people, people in difficulty are." They were not able to eat "only morning 
glory and fish paste" (Hun Sen l996c). Alluding to starvation conditions 
under the Khmer Rouge, he remonstrated: 
If we eat grass, rice gruel or noodles, let us eat them together. We 
should share weal or woe with each other. It is not desirable to have 
leaders who join in only when it is time to eat good things, such as noo-
dles, and who quickly run away when people are forced to eat rice gruel. 
(Hun Sen 1996a) 
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In short, Khmer Angkor had not fled the country in hard times and would 
share in the country's suffering. Returning refugees' weak nationalism 
could not compare with the nationalism of leaders who, in local parlance, 
had "gone through the blood." 
This rhetoric, however, obscured the fact that many CPP officials who 
were formerly Khmer Rouge (including Hun Sen) deserted their posts and 
fled to Vietnam early in Pol Pot's genocidal regime. When they returned 
with the Vietnamese troops in 1979, most were installed in the Vietnamese-
backed socialist government. As most Cambodian refugees fled at the fall 
of the Khmer Rouge regime in 1979, it is ironic that Hun Sen claims a 
share in the suffering of Cambodians-presumably under their own decade-
long administration under Vietnam. It is thus striking that Hun Sen 
characterizes refugee flight as a choice of self-preservation over duty, a 
choice made by members of his own party. 
But the CPP challenge to the legitimacy of refugee flight played upon 
a deep ambivalence towards refugees in the general population. No doubt, 
a good measure of populist envy also entered into this calculation. Officials 
of the Lon Nol regime who left Cambodia before 1975 were the primary 
targets of disdain. Those who survived the Khmer Rouge years might 
inspire the empathy of fellow survivors, but their departure at the point 
of critical reconstruction at the installation of the Vietnamese-backed 
People's Republic of Kampuchea was also a betrayal. The link between 
postcolonial refugee statelessness and colonial affiliations demystified 
refugee identity. The deposed elite often sought refugee status in the 
nations that had supported them. If as refugees, Cambodia's elite turned 
their early French and US contacts into resettlement sites, returning with 
the mantle of Metropole citizenship and often under their financial backing, 
how could their claim to Cambodian nationalism escape suspicion? 
Dual citizens had given away the country, and their plea for the hybrid 
identity of officials could further destabilize the government, claimed Hun 
Sen (Hun Sen 1996a ). If the two parties were wrestling for the meat of 
the nation, the Second Prime Minister charged that the "foreign" dog 
(chhkae sot) had its jaws on the leg of the government. If dual citizens 
could run for office, then Vietnamese and Chinese, also anikachun, could 
take advantage of such an opportunity, producing a "Cambodian parlia-
ment and government ... full of half-blood foreigners" (Hun Sen 1996a). 
Hun Sen's diatribe against "half-blood foreigners" in the government 
percolated on the diaspora Cambodian internet as the debate raged in 
Phnom Penh. It traveled between a listserve and a newsgroup when I initi-
ated a discussion on the matter from May 9 to May 14, 1996. As many 
overseas Cambodians were subscribers to both groups, the responses shut-
tled between them. While there was general assent that Hun Sen's move 
was a crass ploy to destabilize FUNCINPEC, and that Hun Sen's loyal-
ties were split between Cambodia and Vietnam, the morality of multiple 
citizenships for officials was vigorously debated. A minority argued that 
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government officials could hold two passports; some proposed it as a 
temporary measure to encourage more highly skilled "Khmer expats" to 
return; most agreed that government officials should give up their second 
passport to show a commitment to building a Cambodian state. After all, 
one noted, "[Hun Sen] did not say that expatriates cannot hold high 
offices-just that they are not dual citizens" (online posting by psuOOOO@ 
odin.cc.pdx.edu 1996). Many subscribers condemned the corruption and 
moral turpitude of FUNCINPEC and other exiles. The general sentiment 
of the group was that it was "time to test the seriousness and honest 
integrity of Cambodian politicians ... If ones [sic] do not have courage 
and principles to fight for Cambodia, they should have no damn business 
in the decision-making that affects the destiny and lives of Cambodian 
people" (online posting by psuOOOO@odin.cc.pdx.edu 1996). 
Anikachun nationalism 
For Anderson ( 1991 ), national identity is an ideological process in which 
a political community "thinks" their nation into being; the nation is an 
imagined community. Such communities are made up of citizens who 
espouse a "deep horizontal comradeship." In an era of transnational link-
ages and flexible citizenships, Cambodian returnees asserted the virtue of 
multiple "comradeships" and the dangers of an ethnic basis for nation-
ality. Impatient with their discursive and political marginalization as 
anikachun, dual citizens in Cambodia did not take the quest for a single-
hearted nationalism as seriously as their diasporic kin or local Cambodians. 
Hun Sen's claim that leadership required an originary Khmerness led one 
Cambodian American to remark confidentially: 
All of our leaders came from elsewhere and were supported by them. 
If you see Sihanouk, supported by French, if you see Lon No!, 
supported by who-you-know [sic]. If you see Pol Pot, he was in France 
and supported by China; Hun Sen, Vietnam. It's coming back to 
French again, French and Vietnamese ... and American. 
While First Prime Minister Ranariddh kept silent, other dual citizens in 
office argued that their dual nationality did not jeopardize the state but in 
fact augmented it (Heng and Seng 1996; Ker 1996). They stressed that they 
had sacrificed productive lives in the West to return and contribute to 
Cambodia's reconstruction (Cambodia Times 1996). Other transnational 
Cambodian officials stressed the usefulness of their dual national identities. 
Ahmad Yahya, representing Cham Muslims in the National Assembly, 
asserted that he would maintain his American citizenship if he had to give 
up one passport because "nationality is not important. What is important is 
patriotism" (Cambodia Times 1996 ). His claim to Cham ethnicity and advo-
cacy for their rights already disrupted the implied ethnic Khmerness of"true 
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Cambodian" patriots, and his American passport pressed this point further. 
His particular form of patriotism reflected the flexible interpretation of 
"nationality" held by most formerly exiled Cambodian officials. In our 
meeting, he noted that if his colleagues came from the US, they were "pro-
US, if they came from France, they're pro-France, Australia, pro-Australia." 
But unlike their Cambodian communist counterparts, they shared the "same 
mentality" about democracy, human rights, and rule of law. 
When queried on their "flightiness," dual citizens in Phnom Penh were 
often quite curt. One Cambodian American woman remarked dryly, 
"Cambodian people here, I've heard it many times, they think that once 
something happens, we're going to fly away, leave them." This argument 
against refugee flight indicted all returning Cambodians, though its impli-
cation for government officials held the most weight. Various Cambodian 
Americans stated that if such a political crisis would emerge, money and 
political power would trump a second passport. A Cambodian American in 
Phnom Penh stated a simple truth: "The people with the money will leave; 
the poor will stay." As for the claim that returning Cambodians had more 
wealth to protect, the same man admitted that many FUNCINPEC officials 
were certainly corrupt, but added that many former classmates who had 
never left Cambodia were now much wealthier than he was. However, 
in the summer of 1997, a brief but violent power struggle between CPP 
and FUNCINPEC did prove the efficacy of the claims about returning 
Cambodians. Many former exiles fled to Bangkok or further abroad, and 
among them First Prime Minister, Prince Ranariddh. 11 But in 1996, FUNC-
INPEC officials still claimed sure-footedness, and noted that the CPP's ref-
erence to their fleet-footedness hid the hope that FUNCINPEC officials 
would abandon the government to its former proprietors in a time of duress. 
Espousing a diaspora nationalism, returning Cambodians argued that 
their "flightiness" freed them to "speak out the truth" away from the locus 
of repressive power. Cambodians in diaspora-like those on the internet-
were aware of their impact on the Cambodian state. The Cambodian nation 
was now scattered around the globe and the Cambodian state had to 
contend with its de-territorialized constituency. Officials of the CPP, once 
isolated from international scrutiny, now found themselves answerable to 
influential donor nations, the United Nations, the international develop-
ment community, and 300,000 Cambodians in diaspora. If the CPP 
appealed to local Cambodians by declaring the moral authority of a single 
nationality, they had also to address the complaints of the transnational 
Cambodian lobbyists who took national politics onto the streets and into 
the legislative halls of other cities. Hun Sen's challenge to FUNCINPEC 
officials' dual citizenship included an admonishment to Cambodians 
demonstrating in France (Hun Sen 1996a). Those whose "feet are planted 
in two countries" did not know the lived realities of Cambodia. He asked: 
"do they know the conditions of democracy in the countryside?" Until 
they were able to leap over canals with him in the countryside, "it is not 
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right to hurl insults at each other in Paris, Belgium, Washington or Phnom 
Penh" (Hun Sen 1996a). Frustrated by his inability to restrain diaspora 
dissent, he warned against demonstrations within his reach: "Be careful! 
I will act. I will use military force to deal with you" (Hun Sen 1996a). 
This threat to suppress opposition was a good reason to support the 
dual citizenship of officials, noted a Cambodian American on the internet: 
It is already sad enough that people must exile out of the country in 
order to speak out the truth on the current situation inside Cambodia 
... The very least we can do is to extend our moral support for politi-
cians that risk their lives by trying to bring changes to Cambodia. 
(Thean 1996) 
Between two chairs: what is true loyalty? 
If Ahmad Yahya was not a "true Cambodian," Marina Pok, Undersecretary 
of Foreign Affairs, was neither "true" nor "pure" Cambodian. She was 
the daughter of a French Cambodian mother and Cambodian father; her 
family had escaped to France before the Khmer Rouge arrived in Phnom 
Penh. As a recipient of "dual cultures" as well as dual nationalities, she 
vigorously rejected the pressure to relinquish either. During my interview 
with her, she asked, "Is it against the interest of the nation? Is it to have 
a pure Cambodian nation?" She demolished the conflation of nation and 
ethnic purity at the heart of Hun Sen's diatribe by arguing that neither 
true nor pure local Cambodians exist. The ideology of a pure Khmer 
ethnicity was a dangerous legacy in Cambodia that had inspired both 
General Lon Nol's racist nationalism and the Khmer Rouge policy of 
extermination. Furthermore, if pre-war Cambodian society was the bench-
mark for cultural authenticity, it was, as another Cambodian American 
put it, "deep under the sea." 
Marina Pok then struck at the heart of Prime Minister Hun Sen's charge 
that those like her were not Khmer Angkor-stationary Khmers who repre-
sented the heart of Cambodia. "Are Khmer nationals better citizens?" she 
asked, "Is their allegiance more certain?" Arguing that historical experi-
ence affects morality more than legal affiliation to a second state, she 
remarked that those who survived the Khmer Rouge period and subse-
quent regimes "had to betray their neighbor, to kill their neighbor in order 
to survive." Their "values," she noted cautiously, were "very ... diverted." 
Then she added: 
Being a returnee, I need to have a relationship with my colleagues, 
and loyalty is a basic part of the relationship of work. It's very diffi-
cult, because these people today need me because I am in a strong 
position. But tomorrow, they will just turn back and follow somebody 
else who is in a stronger position to serve their interests. And these 
are people who have one nationality. 
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Loyalty, concluded Undersecretary Pok, was a trait that did not sit well 
with pragmatists; personal affairs often trump national interests. The 
number of passports cannot measure loyalty and national diplomacy. 
If, according to Undersecretary Pok, neither ethnic purity nor possess-
ing a single passport has any claim on national loyalties, does dual affiliation 
affect the course of national diplomacy? As Pok was Undersecretary of 
Foreign Affairs and the liaison to ASEAN, the highly regarded regional 
affiliation of Southeast Asian nations, her dual associations did have mul-
tiple effects. She offered three examples. In the first case, she referred to 
her participation in the negotiation between an "Asian" state and "Western" 
pressure for Cambodia to adhere to human rights standards. The weight of 
her "heritage of Western education" predisposed her to the human rights 
agenda more readily than her ASEAN colleagues. In domestic affairs, how-
ever, she took an "Asian" interpretation of rights concerned with economic 
development over civil rights. If in the human rights argument she identi-
fied an Asia-West binary cultural position, her status as an official of an 
"underdeveloped" post-socialist country set her at the bottom rung of Asia's 
aggressive modernity. She related in a second example how she was dis-
missed by a Western official as an unrealistic diplomat from an "emerging 
country." She felt the sting as a Cambodian subjected to the disdain of 
those with whom she shared, in other circles, similar cultural capital. 
The bargaining tables of both ASEAN neighbors and Western donors, 
she suggested, were minefields that one must maneuver. Neither local nor 
transnational Cambodians evaded the humiliations, but for those whose 
identities were doubly ambivalent, the consciousness of being associated 
with both was more acute. Thus Marina Pok related this final tale of 
Fanon-like epiphany of collapsed consciousness. In a conversation with a 
French colleague about an upcoming trip to Thailand for a meeting with 
private investors, they discussed what clothes they would bring: 
"Are you going to bring a national dress?" my friend asked. And I 
said "Yeah, I am." And she said, "It would look so ridiculous ... 
because investors want to see the modern. Thai women active in Thai 
society do not wear Thai national dress anymore ... You would look 
like [you were wearing a] boubou" (you know, African women in 
France who are dressed in the bright African dress). I never thought 
that if I go to a meeting wearing a Cambodian national dress, it would 
look like a boubou! 
To be signified by a boubou, then, is to be identified as an inassimilable 
postcolonial immigrant in the Metropole. Which mask does she wear? 
Marina Pok was neither a French Cambodian wearing a boubou nor a 
Khmer Angkor stateswoman. Seven Cambodian women were elected into 
office, and in official photos they posed in "Cambodian national dress." 
She related the message that dual citizens know so well-as citizens of 
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several countries, they are native to none. ln their second homes, they are 
hyphenated; in their first home, they are anikachun. 
But it is also an argument made in my presence to indicate that as an 
official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Undersecretary Pok was culti-
vating a sophisticated national identity to accommodate Asia's high 
modernity. Given the contentious transition in the following year, when 
many FUNCINPEC officials were expelled, Pok's inference is important 
because it stresses that dual citizens could be critical to maneuver 
Cambodia's transition into a new global polity. This was because, she 
argued, dual citizens were adept at the reflexive manners of modernity, 
and able to market Angkor's vestigial glory while interpreting Cambodia's 
particular democratic polity to humanitarian donors. 
Conclusion 
The issue of dual citizenship that arose during debates on the Law on 
Nationality in 1996 was, in some ways, a politics of dissimulation on both 
sides. On the one hand, it was staged as a vociferous campaign by offi-
cials of the former regime who invoked a nation of cultural purity based 
on stationary Khmerness, a status few could authentically claim in twenty 
years of massive displacement, occupation, and civil war. Returning 
Cambodians were characterized as morally compromised because they had 
been self-serving as refugees, and thus unreliable; they were now anikachun 
and thus not fully members of the nation; and finally, their dual allegiance 
was dangerous for a fragile democracy. As both parties were the subject 
of proxy politics, these claims might have been dismissed were it not that 
they exploited a deep-seated anxiety about Cambodia's political stability 
and general desire for a clear national identity. 
The dual citizens in government with whom I spoke articulated a moral 
discourse of dual commitments that resolved for them the dilemmas posed 
by local officials and their diaspora compatriots. They first rejected the 
discursive distinction between anikachun and true or pure Khmer. Because 
their "purity" had been questioned, disapora Cambodians depicted purity 
itself as a ploy to keep them outside the nation. In its place they argued 
for a heterogeneous body of peoples as Cambodia's future. Plurality in 
Cambodia's home space re-narrated the meaning of membership to include 
its transnational citizens in diaspora communities around the world. Their 
defense of refugee "flightiness" was less articulate and proved to be 
prophetic during the 1997 coup when many FUNCINPEC officials fled 
the conflict. Their claim to patriotic altruism by returning from lucrative 
salaries to assist with Cambodia's reconstruction belied the popular percep-
tion that returning Cambodian officials were as corrupt and greedy as their 
local counterparts. 
Because singular national identity was held as a standard for govern-
ment service, dual citizens challenged the sacred character of this 
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singularity. Their strategies sometimes slipped across the hyphen, asserting 
Cambodian patriotism while claiming US interests. As far as allegiance 
was concerned, dual citizens in Phnom Penh contested the inviolability of 
Khmer Angkor loyalty. Pok's responses represented a general sentiment 
among returning Cambodians. If refugees were held suspect for fleeing, 
those who stayed survived by morally questionable means. Pragmatism 
often trumped the higher principles of loyalty in difficult times, and no 
one was above reproach. Rather than a detriment, dual consciousness could 
facilitate Cambodia's re-entry into the complex, sophisticated dynamics 
of international affairs. 
How does transnational identity affect this moral discourse? The study 
of the moral reasoning of Cambodian Americans suggests a strategy for 
inclusion that employs all subject positions available to them. If they spoke 
as Cambodians to the media, and dual citizens in the Assembly, others 
adjusted in my presence to identify as US citizens. But this identification 
with two nations is not co-equal, or a slippery status that one can shift 
into--and out of-easily. It is played along various vectors of power. 
Claiming the West offers one a taste of positional superiority when 
returning "home," it is also a painful reminder of one's secondary status 
among those with whom one shares the more privileged passport. Claiming 
to be Cambodian ranks one as third class in the global hierarchy of nations, 
and with "locals" one is dismissed by the exclusionary tactics of nation-
alist and ressentiment politics. This hybrid positionality redefined such 
politically charged words as national purity, loyalty, and commitment 
during Cambodia's reconstruction in the mid-1990s. This was, perhaps, 
for those engaged in the struggle, as difficult as sitting in a space between 
two chairs. 
Notes 
Fieldwork for this paper was partially funded by the Social Science Research 
Council. I wish to acknowledge the two editors, Leakthina Oilier and Tim Winter 
for their support and careful editing. I am indebted to Leakthina Oilier for her 
assistance on the linguistic analysis of anikachun identity. Khatharya Urn, Aihwa 
Ong, Claire Fisher, Marty Stortz, and Jane Margold also offered feedback on 
an earlier draft of this paper. 
2 All material quoted without a source in this chapter is from personal interviews 
with the author conducted in Cambodia in 1996. 
3 South America and the Caribbean have had various dual citizen treaties for 
many years (Jones-Correa 2003). Asian countries where labor migration and 
immigration are high are also following suit. Among these countries are 
Cambodia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and most recently, India 
and the Philippines (see Renshon 2001). 
4 Included here are Milan Panic who was offered the post of prime minister in 
Serbia in 1992, and Mohammad Sacirby who was offered the post of Bosnian 
ambassador to the United Nations. Rein Taagepera ran unsuccessfully for pres-
ident of Estonia, and Canadian citizen Stanislaw Tyminski ran against Lech 
Walesa for president of Poland (Anderson 1994). 
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5 Initially named People's Republic of Kampuchea under the Vietnamese occu-
pation, the government changed its name to the State of Cambodia on April 30, 
1989 as Vietnam withdrew. 
6 The Cambodian Constitution, www.constitution.org/cons/cambodia.htm. 
7 Dual citizenship and dual nationality are often used interchangeably though they 
differ slightly. Bar Yaacov (1961) identifies five ways to acquire a dual citi-
zenship: naturalization, through the naturalization of one's own parents; 
acquisition through marriage; military service in a second state without loss of 
earlier citizenship; as an illegitimate child born in one country after which the 
foreign-born father is identified; and finally, return to the country of origin and 
reactivating former citizenship. 
8 Vietnam was Sino-Confucian, and its attitude towards its "barbarian" neighbors 
included a civilizing mission that in the mid-1800s involved a "Vietnamization" 
of language, dress, and administration (Chandler 1993a: 123ff.). Additionally, 
its colonizing strategy involved replacing Cambodian peasants with Vietnamese 
settlers. This slow appropriation of Cambodian territory and Cambodia's percep-
tion of Vietnam's ethnocentrism is a large contributor to the long-standing hatred 
and fear of the Vietnamese expressed by generations of Cambodians. 
9 It finally became evident that dual citizenship was not the domain of the Law 
on Nationality but the Electoral Law. Though the former determined who would 
be eligible as citizens to vote, the Electoral Law would identify which citizens 
could be candidates. The Law on Nationality, passed in October 1996, supported 
dual citizenship, and the Electoral Law, passed in December 1997, did not bar 
dual citizens from office. 
I 0 Geyer ( 1996) also uses the metaphor of bigamy when arguing against American 
dual citizenship. 
II Donovan ( 1998) argues that the coup de force by Hun Sen revealed his under-
standing and use of political theater over written law. Ranariddh, a law professor 
in France, and other exiles were schooled in legal culture of the Western liberal 
tradition that relied on the force of written law. Hun Sen employed the more 
ritualized features of the "theater state" of Indic Southeast Asia. Hun Sen could 
have legally unseated Ranariddh when it was discovered that he illegally 
imported arms, with further dealings in arms from the Khmer Rouge. Instead, 
because he controlled the military, Hun Sen sent troops to encircle Phnom Penh. 
In the meantime, Ranariddh fled the country and was replaced as First Prime 
Minister by Ung Rout, an Australian citizen. On July 5 fighting broke out 
between the two forces in Phnom Penh. By the end of the following day, Hun 
Sen was victorious. Thus instead of using law, Hun Sen employed the armed 
forces and political theater to establish his sole legitimacy for political leadership. 
